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Abstract
Recent studies suggest that cooperative decision-making in one-shot interactions
is a history-dependent dynamic process: promoting intuition versus deliberation has
typically a positive effect on cooperation (dynamism) among people living in a coop-
erative setting and with no previous experience in economic games on cooperation
(history-dependence). Here we report on a lab experiment exploring how these
findings transfer to a non-cooperative setting. We find two major results: (i) pro-
moting intuition versus deliberation has no effect on cooperative behavior among
inexperienced subjects living in a non-cooperative setting; (ii) experienced subjects
cooperate more than inexperienced subjects, but only under time pressure. These
results suggest that cooperation is a learning process, rather than an instinctive
impulse or a self-controlled choice, and that experience operates primarily via the
channel of intuition. In doing so, our findings shed further light on the cognitive
basis of human cooperative decision-making and provide further support for the
recently proposed Social Heuristics Hypothesis.
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Introduction
One of the factors of the enormous success of our societies is our ability to cooperate
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. While in most animal species cooperation
is observed only among kin or in very small groups, where future interactions are likely,
cooperation among people goes far beyond the five rules of cooperation [16]: recent
experiments have shown that people cooperate also in one-shot anonymous interactions
[17, 18, 19, 20, 21] and even in large groups [22]. This poses an evolutionary puzzle:
why are people willing to pay costs to help strangers when no future rewards seem to
be at stake?
A growing body of experimental research suggests that cooperative decision-making
in one-shot interactions is most likely a history-dependent dynamic process. Dynamic
because time pressure [23, 24, 25, 26, 27], cognitive load [28, 29, 30], conceptual priming
of intuition [23, 31], and disruption of the right lateral prefrontal cortex [32] have all been
shown to promote cooperation, providing direct evidence that automatic actions are,
on average, more cooperative than deliberate actions. History-dependent because it has
been found that previous experience with economic games on cooperation and intuition
interact such that experienced subjects are less cooperative than inexperienced subjects,
but only under time pressure [24] and that intuition promotes cooperative behavior
only among inexperienced subjects with above median trust in the setting where they
live [26]. While this latter paper also shows that promoting intuition versus reflection
has no effect among experienced subjects, its results are inconclusive with regard to
people with little trust in their environment, due to the limited number of observations.
More generally, the limitation of previous studies is that they have all been conducted
in developed countries and so they do not allow to draw any conclusions about what
happens among people from a societal background in which they are exposed to frequent
non-cooperative acts.
Two fundamental questions remain then unsolved. What is the effect of promoting in-
tuition versus deliberation among people living in a non-cooperative setting? How does
this interact with previous experience with economic games on cooperative decision-
making?
The first question is particularly intriguing since, based on existing theories, several
alternatives are possible. The Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH), introduced by Rand
and colleagues [23, 24] to explain the intuitive predisposition towards cooperation de-
scribed above “posits that cooperative decision making is guided by heuristic strategies
3
that have generally been successful in one’s previous social interactions and have, over
time, become internalized and automatically applied to social interactions that resem-
ble situations one has encountered in the past. When one encounters a new or atypical
social situation that is unlike previous experience, one generally tends to rely on these
heuristics as an intuitive default response. However, through additional deliberation
about the details of the situation, one can override this heuristic response and arrive
at a response that is more tailored to the current interaction” [25]. Then, according to
the SHH, inexperienced subjects living in a non-cooperative setting should bring their
non-cooperative strategy (learned in the setting where they live) in the lab as a default
strategy. These subjects are then predicted to act non-cooperatively both under time
pressure, because they use their non-cooperative default strategy, and under time delay,
because defection is optimal in one-shot interactions.
However, this is not the only possibility. Several studies have shown that patients
who suffered ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage, which causes the loss of emotional
responsiveness, are more likely to display anti-social behavior [33, 34, 35]. These findings
support the interpretation that intuitive emotions play an important role in pro-social
behavior and form the basis of Haidt’s Social Intuition Model (SIM) according to which
moral judgment is caused by quick moral intuitions and is followed (when needed) by
slow, ex post facto, moral reasoning [36]. While the SIM does not make any prediction on
what happens in the specific domain of cooperation, it would certainly be consistent with
a general intuitive predisposition towards cooperation, mediated by positive emotions,
and independent of the social setting in which an individual is embedded.
A third alternative is yet possible. Motivated by work suggesting that people whose
self-control resources have been taxed tend to cheat more [37, 38] and be less altruistic
[39, 40, 41], it has been argued that self-control plays an important role in overriding
selfish impulses and bringing behavior in line with moral standards. This is consistent
with Kohlberg’s rationalist approach [42], which assumes that moral choices are guided
by reason and cognition: as their cognitive capabilities increase, people learn how to
take the other’s perspective, which is fundamental for pro-social behavior. This rational-
ist approach makes the explicit prediction that promoting intuition always undermine
cooperation.
In sum, the question of how promoting intuition versus reflection affects cooperative
behavior among people living in a non-cooperative setting is far from being trivial and,
based on existing theories, all three possibilities (positive effect, negative effect, no
effect) are, a priori, possible.
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Concerning previous experience on economic games, while the SIM and the rationalist
approach do not make any prediction about its role on cooperative decision-making
among people living in a non-cooperative setting, the SHH predicts that it has either
a null or a positive effect driven by intuitive responses. This because experienced par-
ticipants, despite their living in a non-cooperative setting, might have internalized a
cooperative strategy to be used only in experiments. Of course, the SHH does not
predict that a substantial proportion of subjects have in fact developed such a context-
dependent cooperative intuition - and this is why the predicted effect is either positive
or null. In the former case, however, the SHH predicts that the positive effect should be
driven by intuitive responses, since the SHH assumes that experience operates primarily
through the channel of intuition.
Here we report on an experiment aimed at clarifying these points. We provide evi-
dence of two major results: (i) promoting intuition versus reflection has no effect on
cooperation among subjects living in a non-cooperative setting and with no previous
experience with economic games on cooperation; (ii) experienced subjects are more co-
operative than inexperienced subjects, but only when acting under time pressure.
Taken together, these results suggest that cooperation is a learning process, rather than
an instinctive impulse or a self-controlled choice, and that experience operates primarily
via the channel of intuition. In doing so, they shed further light on human cooperative
decision-making and provide further support for the Social Heuristics Hypothesis.
Methods
We have conducted an experiment using the online labor market Amazon Mechanical
Turk (AMT )[43, 44, 45] recruiting participants only from India. India is a particularly
suited country to hire people from for our purpose: if, as many studies have confirmed
[46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57], good institutions are crucial for the evo-
lution of cooperation, and if, as many scholars have argued [58, 59, 60, 61], corruption
and cronyism are endemic in Indian society, then residents in India are likely to have
very little trust on strangers and so they are likely to have internalized non-cooperative
strategies in their every-day life. One study confirms this hypothesis, by showing that
spiteful preferences are widespread in the village of Uttar Pradesh and this ultimately
implies residents’ inability to cooperate [62]. At the same time, according to demo-
graphic studies on AMT population [63], India is the second most active country on
AMT after the US, which facilitates the procedure of collecting data.
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Participants were randomly assigned to either of two conditions: in the time pressure
condition we measured intuitive cooperation; in the time delay condition we measured
deliberate cooperation. As a measure of cooperation, we adopted a standard two-person
Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) with a continuous set of strategies. Specifically, participants
were given an endowment of $0.20, and asked to decide how much, if any, to transfer to
the other participant. The amount transferred would be multiplied by 2 and earned by
the other participant; the remainder would be earned by themselves, but without being
multiplied by any factor. Each participant was informed that the other participant
was facing the same decision problem. Participants in the time pressure condition were
asked to make a decision within 10 seconds and those in the time delay condition were
asked to wait for at least 30 seconds before making their choice. After making their
decision, participants had to answer four comprehension questions, after which they
entered the demographic questionnaire, where, along with the usual questions, we also
asked “To what extent have you previously participated in other studies like to this one
(e.g., exchanging money with strangers)?” using a 5 point Likert-scale from “Never” to
“Several times”. As in previous studies [23, 24, 26], we used the answer to this question
as a measure of participant’s previous experience with economic games on cooperative
decision-making. As in these studies, we say that a subject is inexperienced if he or she
answered “never” to the above question. In the Supplementary Online Material we also
report the results of a pilot, in which we measured participants’ level of experience by
asking them to report the extent to which they had participated in exactly the same
task before. Although the use of the word “exactly” may lead to confusion, with some
minor differences in the details, our main results are robust to the use of this measure
(see Supplementary Online Material for more details).
After collecting the results, bonuses were computed and paid on top of the participation
fee ($0.50). No deception was used.
Results
A total of 949 subjects participated in our experiment. Taken globally, results contain
a lot of noise, since only 449 subjects passed the comprehension questions. Here we
restrict our analysis to subjects who passed all comprehension questions and we refer
the reader to the Supplementary Online Material for the analysis of those subjects who
failed the attention check. We include in our analysis also subjects who did not obey
the time constraint in order to avoid selection problems that impair causal inference
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[64].
First we ascertain that our time manipulation effectively worked. Analyzing partici-
pants’ decision times, we find that those in the time delay condition (N = 246) took,
on average, 45.64 seconds to make their decision, while those under time pressure took,
on average, only 20.04 seconds. Thus, although many subjects under time pressure did
not obey the time constraint, the time manipulation still had a substantial effect.
Participants under time pressure transferred, on average, 27.93% of their endowment,
and those under time delay transferred, on average, 28.57% of their endowment. Linear
regression using time manipulation as a dummy variable confirms that the difference is
not statistically significant (coeff = 0.00646201, p = 0.8572), even after controlling for
age, sex, and level of education (coeff = 0.0108648 p = 0.7265). We note that restricting
the analysis to subjects who obeyed the time constraint leads to qualitatively equivalent
results (26.11% under time pressure vs 29.02% under time delay, coeff = 0.310051,
p = 0.4868). Thus, promoting intuition versus reflection does not have any effect on
cooperative decision-making. En passant, we note that these percentages are far below
those observed among US residents in a very similar experiment [19]. More precisely,
in this latter paper, US residents started out with a $0.10 endowment and were asked
to decide how much, if any, to give to the other person. As in the current study, the
amount transferred would be multiplied by 2 and earned by the other player. Strictly
speaking, these two experiments are not comparable for three reasons. First, in [19]
there was no time manipulation; second, the initial endowments were different; third,
stakes used in the experiment in the US did not correspond to the same stakes in
Indian currency. According to previous research, these differences are minor. Indeed,
recent studies have argued that stakes do not matter as long as they are not too high
[44, 65] and that neutrally framed PDs give rise to a percentage of cooperation sitting
between that obtained in the time pressure condition and that obtained in the time
delay condition [23]. Thus comparing the percentage of cooperation in the current
study (28%) with that reported in [19] (52%) supports our assumption that the average
Indian sample is particularly non-cooperative or, at least, less cooperative than the
average US sample.
Next we investigate our main research questions. Figure 1 summarizes our results,
providing visual evidence that (i) promoting intuition versus reflection has no signifi-
cant effect on cooperation among inexperienced subjects; that (ii) experienced subjects
cooperate more than inexperienced subjects, but only when acting under time pres-
sure.
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More specifically, we find that inexperienced subjects under time pressure (N = 47)
transferred, on average, 19.78% of their endowment while those under time delay (N =
73) transferred, on average, 26.98% of their endowment. The difference is not signifi-
cant (coeff = 0.0719907, p = 0.2306), even after controlling for all socio-demographic
variables (coeff = 0.0711474, p = 0.2337). Thus, promoting intuition versus reflection
has no effect on cooperation among inexperienced subjects living in a non-cooperative
setting. This finding is robust to controlling for people who did not obey the time
constraint (coeff = 0.156951, p = 0.5560) and to controlling for people who obeyed the
time contraint (coeff = 0.0371963, p = 0.8082).
To explore the interaction between experience and cooperative behavior, as in previ-
ous studies [23, 24, 26], we separate subjects into experienced and inexperienced. This
procedure comes from the observation that, although the level of experience is a cate-
gorical variable, the association between participant’s objective level of experience and
their answer to our question is objective only in case of inexperienced subjects. Linear
regression predicting cooperation using experience as a dummy variable confirms that
experience with economic games on cooperation favors the emergence of cooperative
choices, but only among people in the time pressure condition (time pressure: coeff
= 1.05974, p = 0.04464; time delay: coeff = 0.217945, p = 0.63930). These results
are robust to including control on the socio-demographic variables (time pressure: coeff
= 1.05054, p = 0.04641; time delay: coeff = 0.215053, p = 0.64603). Our main results
are also robust to using non-parametric tests, such as Wilcoxon rank-sum: the rate of
cooperation of inexperienced subjects is not statistically distinguishable from the rate
of cooperation of inexperienced subjects acting under time delay both when they act
under time pressure (p = 0.3271) and under time delay (p = 0.5619); and the rate of
cooperation of inexperienced subjects is significantly smaller than that of experienced
subjects, but only among those acting under time pressure (time pressure: p = 0.0251;
time delay: p = 0.4715). For completeness, we also report the results of linear regres-
sion predicting cooperation using level of experience as independent variable. We find
that level of experience has a marginally significant positive effect on cooperation among
subjects acting under time pressure (coeff = 0.327449, p = 0.06343) and has no effect on
cooperation among subjects acting under time delay (coeff = 0.210234, p = 0.20062).
Also these results are robust to including control on all the socio-demographic vari-
ables (time pressure: coeff = 0.305278, p = 0.08438; time delay: coeff = 0.19119,
p = 0.25112).
The increase of cooperation from inexperienced subjects to experienced subjects seems
to be driven by participants under time pressure who did not obey the time constraint.
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Figure 1: Average amount transferred per condition (time pressure vs time delay) divided
by level of experience in economic games on cooperation (na¨ıve vs non-na¨ıve). Error
bars represent the standard error of the mean. Inexperienced subjects under time delay
transferred slightly more than inexperienced subjects under time pressure, but the differ-
ence is not statistically significative (p = 0.2306). Previous experience with economic
games on cooperation has a positive effect on cooperation, but only among participants
in the time pressure condition (p = 0.04464).
Specifically, linear regression predicting cooperation using experience as a dummy vari-
able yields non-significant results in case of participants who obeyed the time pres-
sure condition (without control: coeff = 0.137931, p = 0.8864; with control: coeff
= 0.0760645, p = 0.9390) and significant results in case of participants who did not
obey it (without control: coeff = 0.151793, p = 0.0166; with control: coeff = 0.150522,
p = 0.0180). This is not surprising and it is most probably due to noise generated by
a combination of two factors: the set of people who obeyed the time pressure contraint
is very small (for instance, only 14 inexperienced people obeyed the time constraint)
and it is more likely to contain people who did not understand the decision problem
but passed the comprehension questions by chance (which we estimated to be 5% of the
total. See Supplementary Online Material).
Discussion
We have shown that (i) promoting intuition via time pressure versus promoting delib-
eration via time delay has no effect on cooperative behavior among subjects residents
9
in India with no previous experience with economic games on cooperation, and that (ii)
experience has a positive effect on cooperation, but this effect is significant only among
subjects acting under time pressure.
Our results have several major implications, the first of which is providing further
support for the Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) [23, 24]. Introduced in order to
organize the growing body of literature providing direct [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
31, 32] and indirect [66, 67, 68, 69] evidence that, on average, intuitive responses are
more cooperative than reflective responses, the SHH contends that people internalize
strategies that are successful in their everyday social interactions and then apply them
to social interactions that resemble situations they have encountered in the past. Thus,
when they encounter a new or atypical situation, people tend to rely on these heuristics
and use them as intuitive responses. Deliberation can override these heuristics and
adjust the behavior towards one that is more tailored to the current interaction.
As such, the SHH makes a prediction that has not been tested so far: inexperienced
subjects living in a non-cooperative setting should act non-cooperatively both under
time pressure, because they use their non-cooperative default strategy (learned in the
setting where they live), and under time delay, because defection is optimal in one-shot
interactions. Our results support this prediction.
Besides this prediction, the SHH is also consistent with an interaction between level
of previous experience with economic games on cooperation, time pressure, and co-
operation in one-shot interactions: experienced people, despite their living in a non-
cooperative setting, might have internalized a cooperative strategy, to be used only in
AMT. The SHH does not predict that a substantial proportion of experienced people
have in fact developed this context-dependent intuition for cooperation, but it is cer-
tainly consistent with a positive effect of experience on cooperation driven by intuitive
responses. Our results provide evidence for this phenomenon.
As mentioned in the Introduction, Kohlberg’s rationalist approach makes the explicit
prediction that promoting intuition should always undermine cooperation. Thus our
results support the SHH versus Kohlberg’s rationalistic approach. Of course, this does
not imply that the rationalist approach should be completely rejected: it is indeed
supported by many experimental studies involving pro-social behaviors other than co-
operation. If anything, our results point out that different pro-social behaviors may
emerge from different cognitive processes. Classifying pro-social behaviors in terms of
the processes involved is an important direction for future research towards which, to
the best of our knowledge, only one recent study has attempted a first step [70].
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Supporting the SHH, our results suggest that economic models of human cooperation
should start taking dual processes and individual history into account. Indeed, virtually
all major models of human cooperation are static and decontextualized and only a hand-
ful of papers have recently attempted a first step in the direction of taking dual processes
into account [71, 72, 73, 74]. We believe that extending these approaches to incorporate
also individual history could be a promising direction for future research.
Our findings go beyond the mere support of the SHH. Our cross cultural analysis,
although it is formally not correct, shows that residents in India are, on average, less
cooperative than US residents. The difference is so large (28% vs 52%) that it is hard
to explain it by appealing to minor differences in the experimental designs and so it
deserves to be commented.
One possibility, supported by the experimental evidence that good institutions are cru-
cial in promoting cooperation [46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57] and the
evidence that India struggles on a daily basis to fight corruption in politics at both the
national and local levels [58, 59, 60, 61], is that residents in India may have internalized
non cooperative behavior in their everyday life (because cooperation is not promoted by
their institutions) and they tend to apply it also to the new situation of a lab experiment.
One far-reaching consequence of this interpretation is that the role of local institutions
may go far beyond regularizing behavior. If institutions do not support cooperative
behavior, selfishness may even get internalized and applied to atypical situations where
people rely on heuristics. While this interpretation is supported by a recent study [75]
showing that norms of cooperation learned in one experiment spill over to subsequent
experiments where there are no norms, we recommend caution on our interpretation,
since our results do not show directly that inexperienced residents in India are less co-
operative than US residents because they are embedded into a society whose institutions
do not promote cooperative behavior. However, we believe that this is a fundamental
point that deserves to be rigorously addressed in further research.
Interestingly, we have shown that experienced residents in India are significantly more
cooperative than inexperienced ones. This correlation appears to be even more surpris-
ing if seen in light of recent studies reporting that experience has a negative effect on
cooperation among residents in the US [19, 27]. Although the sign of these effects are
different, they share the property that they are driven by intuitive responses. Thus they
are in line with the SHH, which assumes that experience operates mainly through the
channel of intuition, but it does not make any prediction about the sign of the effect of
experience, which may ultimately depend on a number of factors. While it is relatively
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easy to explain a negative effect of experience with economic games on cooperation, by
appealing to learning of the payoff maximizing strategy, explaining a positive effect is
harder. One possibility is that experienced subjects have learned cooperation in iter-
ated games, where it might be strategically advantageous, and tend to apply it also in
one-shot games. Another possibility is that Turkers are developing a feeling of com-
munity that may favor the emergence of pro-social preferences. Understanding what
mechanisms can promote the emergence of cooperation from a non-cooperative setting
is certainly a fundamental topic for further research.
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Supplementary Information
This Supplementary Information is divided in three sections: in the first section we
report more details about the statistical analysis; in the second section we report full
instructions of our experiment. In the third section we report the results of our pilot
(containing a methodological error in the measure of participants’ level of experience).
With some differences in the details, these results are in line with those reported in
the Main Text and thus provide further evidence in support of our main result that
experienced subjects cooperate more than inexperienced subjects and that experience
operates primarily through the channel of intuition.
More details about the statistical analysis
Socio-demographics
We start by reporting the socio-demographics of participants who passed the compre-
hension questions. Data are summarized in the table. We remind that participants’
level of experience was measured using a 5-point Likert-scale from 1=Never to 5=Sev-
eral times. The socio-demographic statistics show that the majority of subjects in the
time pressure condition did not obey the time constraint. This is likely due to the fact
that reading the instructions of the decision problem takes about six seconds and so
participants had only 4 seconds to understand the problem and make their decision.
However, the mean decision time of participants in the time pressure condition was
much smaller than the mean decision time of participants in the time delay condition,
providing evidence that the time manipulation still had a substantial effect.
pressure delay
N 203 246
sex (M=0, F=1) 0.3054 0.3198
age 31.77 32.52
experience 2.57 2.48
na¨ıvety (na¨ıve=0,non-na¨ıve=1) 0.6685 0.7005
failed time constraint 64% 2%
decision time (in seconds) 20.04 45.64
Table 1: Socio-demographics of the subjects who participated in our experiment.
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Regression tables
In the main text, we have reported several regression results. Here we summarize the
main ones in a table (See Table 2).
pressure pressure pressure delay delay delay
experience 1.06** 1.05** 0.98* 0.22 0.21 0.15
(0.52) (0.52) (0.52) (0.46) (0.47) (0.46)
sex -0.65 0.60 -0.07 -0.06
(0.18) (0.48) (0.46) (0.46)
age -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
education 0.39 0.40 0.44 0.42
(0.32) (0.32) (0.30) (0.29)
time -0.69 1.80
(0.64) (1.52)
constant 2.96*** 1.85 1.99 3.73*** 1.36 0.38
(0.46) (1.91) (1.91) (0.39) (1.89) (2.39)
No. cases 203 203 203 246 246 246
Table 2: Summary of the statistical analysis. For each of the two conditions (pressure
and delay) we report the results of linear regression using experience as a dummy vari-
able, with and without control on all the demographic variables and on dummy variable
“time”, which is 1 is the subject obeyed the time constrain and 0 otherwise. We report
coefficient, standard error, and significance levels, using the notation: *: p < 0.1, **:
p < 0.05, and ***: p < 0.01.
Estimation of the percentage of subjects who failed the attention check
Finally we analyze subjects who failed the attention test. Indeed, the large number of
participants who failed the comprehension questions (about half of the total number) is
worrisome that a substantial fraction of those who passed the comprehension questions
may have passed them just by chance. Although this rate of passing is not much lower
than that in similar studies conducted in the US (in a very similar experiment, con-
ducted with American subjects and published in [19], 32% of subjects did not pass the
comprehension questions) it could potentially generate noise in our data. Indeed, sub-
jects who failed the attention test played essentially at random (time pressure: average
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Figure 2: Distribution of responses to the first comprehension question from participants
who failed at least one comprehension question. The distribution is clearly tri-modal,
with about 60% of responses equally distributed among the two extreme choices and the
mid-point. The remaining 40% is equally distributed among all other choices.
transfer = 47.20%; time delay: average transfer = 46.35%).
To exclude this possibility, we analyse failers’ responses to the comprehension questions.
We start with the first comprehension question, which asked “What is the choice by
YOU that maximizes YOUR outcome?”. Participants could choose any even amount of
money from 0c to 20c, for a total of 11 possible choices. Figure 1 reports the distribution
of responses of people who failed at least one comprehension questions. The distribution
is clearly tri-modal, with 60% of responses equally distributed among the two extreme
choices (full cooperation and full defection) and the mid-point (transfer half). The
remaining 40% is equally distributed among all other choices. Consequently, assuming
that confused participants respond to the first comprehension question according to this
distribution, the probability that a confused participant pass the first comprehension
question by chance is equal to 1/5.
Next we analyze the responses to the second comprehension question, which asked
“What is the choice by YOU that maximizes the OTHER PARTICIPANT’s outcome?”.
Figure 2 reports the distribution of answers. Also in this case we find a tri-modal
distribution, although this time the correct answer appeared with higher frequency
(about 50%). Assuming that a confused participant answered this question according
to this distribution, we conclude that a confused participant had probability about 1/10
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Figure 3: Distribution of responses to the second comprehension question from partic-
ipants who failed at least one comprehension question. About half of these participants
answered correctly.
to pass the first two comprehension questions by chance.
Then we analyze the responses to the third comprehension question, which asked “What
is the choice by the OTHER PARTICIPANT that maximizes YOUR outcome?” Figure
3 reports the distribution of answers. This time the distribution is essentially bi-modal,
with about 3/5 of people answering correctly. Assuming that confused participants
answered according to this distribution, we conclude that a confused participant had
probability about 3/50 to pass the first three comprehension questions by chance.
Now, it is impossible to have a clue of what the proportion of confused participants who
passed the fourth comprehension question by chance is. The analysis above suggests
that 3/50 is an upper bound of the probability that a confusing subject passed all
comprehension questions by chance. Interestingly, 88% of subjects who answered 20c
in the third comprehension and failed the fourth comprehension question, answered 20c
also to the fourth comprehension question, which asked “What is the choice by the
OTHER PARTICIPANT that maximizes the OTHER PARTICIPANT’s outcome?”.
This suggests that the actual probability of passing all comprehension questions by
chance is much lower that 3/50. In any case, although our results do not allow to make
a precise estimation of noise, the proportion of people who passed the comprehension
questions by chance is likely below 5% of the total, suggesting that noise is a minor
problem in our data.
21
Figure 4: Distribution of responses to the second comprehension question from partic-
ipants who failed at least one comprehension question. About 3/5 of these participants
answered correctly.
Experimental instructions
Participants were randomly assigned to either the time pressure condition or the time
delay condition. In both conditions, after entering their worker ID, participants were
informed that they would be asked to make a choice in a decision problem to be presented
later and that comprehension questions would be asked. Participants were also informed
that the survey (which was made using the software Qualtrics) contained a skip logic
which would automatically exclude all participants failing any of the comprehension
questions. Specifically, this screen was as follows:
Welcome to this HIT.
This HIT will take about five minutes. For the participation to this HIT, you will earn
0.50 US dollars, that is, about 31 INR. You can also earn additional money depending
on the decisions that you and the other participants will make.
You will be asked to make one decision. There is no incorrect answer. However:
IMPORTANT: after making the decision, to make sure you understood the decision
problem, we will ask some simple questions, each of which has only one correct answer.
If you fail to correctly answer any of those questions, the survey will automatically end
and you will not receive any redemption code and consequently you will not get any
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payment.
With this in mind, do you wish to continue?
At this stage, they could either leave the study or continue. Those who decided to
continue were redirected to an introductory screen where we gave them all the necessary
information about the decision problem, but without telling exactly which one it is. This
is important in order to have the time pressure and time delay conditions work properly
in the next screen. This introductory screen for the participants in the time pressure
condition was the following:
You have been paired with another participant. You can earn additional money depend-
ing on the decision you will make in the next screen. You will be asked to make a
choice that can affect your and the other participant’s outcome. The decision problem
is symmetric: also the other participant is facing the same decision problem. After
the survey is completed, you will be paid according to your and the other participant’s
choices.
You will have only 10 seconds to make the choice.
This is the only interaction you have with the other participant. He or she will not have
the opportunity to influence your gain in later parts of the HIT. If you are ready, go to
the next page.
The introductory screen for the participants in the time delay condition was identical, a
part from the fact that the sentence ‘You will have only 10 seconds to make the choice’
was replaced by the sentence ‘You will be asked to think for at least 30 seconds before
making your choice. Use this time to think carefully about the decision problem’.
The decision screen was the same in both conditions:
You and the other participant are both given $0.20 US dollars. You and the other partic-
ipant can transfer, independently, money to the each other. Every cent you transfer, will
be multiplied by 2 and earned by the other participant. Every cent you do not transfer,
will be earned by you.
How much do you want to transfer?
By using appropriate buttons, participants could transfer any even amount of money
from $0 to $0.20.
En passant, we observe that reading the decision screen takes about six seconds and thus
participants under time pressure had only about four seconds to make their choice.
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To assure that time pressure and time delay work properly, it is necessary that com-
prehension questions are asked after the decision has been made. Thus, right after the
decision screen, participants faced the following four comprehension questions.
What is the choice by YOU that maximizes YOUR outcome?
What is the choice by YOU that maximizes the OTHER PARTICIPANT’s outcome?
What is the choice by the OTHER PARTICIPANT that maximizes YOUR outcome?
What is the choice by the OTHER PARTICIPANT that maximizes the OTHER PAR-
TICIPANT’s outcome?
By using appropriate buttons, participants could select any even amount of money
from $0 to $0.20. Participants who failed any of the comprehension questions were
automatically excluded from the survey. Those who answered all questions correctly
entered the demographic questionnaire, where we asked for their age, sex, reason for
their choice, and, most importantly, level of experience in these games. Specifically, we
asked the following question:
To what extent have you previously participated in other studies like to this one (e.g.,
exchanging money with strangers)?
Answers were collected using a 5 point Likert-scale from “1=Never” to “5=Several
times”.
Experimental results of the pilot
Our pilot experiment was identical to our main experiment, except for the fact that,
as a measure of experience, we asked participants to self-report the extent to which
they had participated in “exactly” the same task before. Participants could choose
between: never, once or twice, and several times. The use of the word “exactly” is
problematic, since it might lead to confusion: what does the answer “exactly the same
task” imply? Does it imply that participants have participated in a task with exactly
the same instructions (including time constrains) or does it imply that the participant
have participated in a task containing the same economic game? Figure 4 reports the
results of the pilot. We observe that, indeed, the details are different: level of experience
seem to have a inverted-U effect on cooperation, which, since it has not been replicated
in the main experiment, is probably due to confusion regarding the interpretation of
the word “exactly” . However, as in our main experiment, we find that experienced
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subjects are significantly more cooperative than little or no experienced subjects and
that this behavioral change is mainly driven by intuitive responses (see Figure 5).
Specifically, linear regression confirms that little experienced subjects are significantly
less cooperative than inexperienced subjects both under time pressure (coeff = −0.0844337,
p = 0.00088) and under time delay (coeff = −0.085229, p = 0.00031); and confirms that
experienced subjects are significantly more cooperative than little experienced subjects
both under time pressure (coeff = 0.374666, p < .0001) and under time delay (coeff
= 0.272971, p < .00001). Moreover, experienced subjects were also significantly more
cooperative than inexperienced subjects, both under time pressure (coeff = 0.145116, p
< .0001) and under time delay (coeff = 0.0938709, p < .0001). Thus experience has a
significant inverted-U effect on cooperation, where little experienced subjects cooperate
the least and experienced subjects the most. The coefficients of the previous regressions
suggest that the motivations behind the initial decrease of cooperation, which affects
subjects under time pressure and those under time delay to exactly the same extent, are
different from the motivations behind the subsequent flourishing of cooperation, which
seems to affect subjects under time pressure to a larger extent than those under time
delay. To confirm this, we use linear regression to predict decision among experienced
subjects using time pressure as a dummy variable. We find that experienced subjects
under time pressure are nearly significantly more cooperative than experienced subjects
under time delay (coeff = 0.0960161, p = 0.09165).
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Figure 5: The figure reports the percentage of the endowment transferred as a function
of the level of experience and condition (time pressure versus time delay). Error bars
denote the standard error of the mean. Promoting intuition versus reflection does not
have any effect among little or no experienced subjects. On the contrary, it seems to
have a positive effect on cooperation among experienced subjects. Linear regression
shows that this effect is nearly significant. Level of experience seems to have a U-shaped
effect on cooperation. Linear regression confirms that little experienced subjects are
significantly less cooperative than both inexperienced and experienced subjects, and that
experienced subjects are significantly more cooperative than inexperienced subjects. As
we have shown in the Main Text, the particular inversed-U effect is probably due to the
confusion generated by the use of the word “exactly” in the measure of participants’
level of experience. The fact that experience promotes cooperation by changing intuitive
responses more than reflective responses is in line with the results reported in the Main
Text.
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